Context
History is littered with events described as intelligence failures, in the 1940’s Pearl Harbour epitomises the apparent outcome of catastrophic intelligence failure. In the 1960’s there is the failed Bay of Pigs operation and in the 1970’s there was Israel’s failure to anticipate the Yom Kippur war. In 2001 it was the failure to anticipate the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. In 2021 it was the failure to anticipate the speed with which the Taliban would advance on and capture Kabul as allied forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Are all of these events simply intelligence failures or is the application of the label intelligence failure a means to obscure investigation into other factors that may have contributed to a sub optimal policy or operational outcome?
Intelligence failure is to some degree accepted as inevitable however, that does not mean the factors that contribute to intelligence failure should be acceptable. Over the years intelligence failure has been subject to judicial, administrative and scholarly examination, the result being a substantive body of literature on the causal factors of failure.
Question
Have the causal factors of intelligence failure changed over the last 70-80 years?
Examine the literature on intelligence failure specifically focusing on the events of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the more recent “intelligence failure” of US/Australian forces inability to anticipate the speed with which the Taliban was able to take back control of Afghanistan in 2021. What factors contributed to the failure in each case? Are there common factors? Are there any significant points of difference? Support your argument/discussion with evidence drawn from the wider intelligence literature.
Referencing: All evidence must be referenced correctly and accord to the APA format.
Headings: You are encouraged to use headings in order that you provide a clear structure to your response.
Must Reference
Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable
Richard K. Betts
World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Oct., 1978), pp. 61-89 (29 pages)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009967
•https://doi.org/10.2307/2009967
Betts, R. K. (2007). Two faces of intelligence failure: September 11 and Iraq’s missing WMD. Political Science Quarterly, 122, 585–606. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/stable/pdf/20202928.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0f66ec8c07f18115379ba4dabf0f74e4
Borch, F. L. (2003). Comparing Pearl Harbor and ‘9/11’: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility? The Journal of Military History, 67, 845–860. https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/scholarly-journals/comparing-pearl-harbor-9-11-intelligence-failure/docview/195622597/se-2?accountid=10675
Davies, P. H. (2004). Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 495–520. https://doi-org.ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/10.1080/0955757042000298188
Hedley, J. H. (2005). Learning from Intelligence Failures. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 18(3), 435–450. http://ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600590945416
ISSN: 1521-0561
Gill, P. (2020). Explaining Intelligence Failure: Rethinking the Recent Terrorist Attacks in Europe. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 33, 43–67. https://doi-org.ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/10.1080/08850607.2019.1663702
Rascoff, S. J. (2009). Domesticating Intelligence. Southern California Law Review, 83, 575–648. http://ezproxy.ecu.edu.au/login?url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/scal83&i=581
Sulmasy, G. Y., & J. (2006). Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law. Michigan Journal of International Law, 28, 625–638. https://ecu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55536152
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